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Lobbying and the First Amendment Right 
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Introduction 
Lobbying has long been an integral part of American politics, a practice 
inseparable from and deeply imbedded in the American way of democracy1. 
Despite its firm roots in the Anglo-American political tradition, lobbying has 
always been the target of severe criticism, not only from the American public but 
from countless political actors2 as well and as such it has been in the focus of 
numerous regulative efforts on the part of the legislature3, both federal and state. 
The sole mention of the word lobbying evokes negative connotations and lobbyists 
are often identified as ruthless influence-peddlers, hired guns who fail to refrain 
from any method when seeking the favors of elected officials4. It doesn't come as a 
surprise then that from time to time - usually following scandals in the lobbying 
arena5 - the need for lobbying reform emerges. This has been so for the entire 
history of lobbying6. This periodically emerging need for reform almost never fails 
1 ANDREW P. THOMAS: Easing the Pressure on Pressure Groups: Toward a Constitutional Right 
to Lobby. 16 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 149, p. 149. 
2 As Krishnakumar puts it wonderfully simply: "Lobbying has long been a dirty word in the eyes 
of the American public", in ANITA S . KRISHNAKUMAR: Towards a Madisonian, Interest-group-based, 
Approach to Lobbying Regulation. 58 Ala. L. Rev. 513, p. 514. 
3 The legislature's efforts at regulating lobbyists are detailed in Part III. of this essay. 
4 In the common thinking these favors from elected officials are usually in exchange for previous 
meals, gifts, fundraising events, campaign contributions provided by the lobbyists, a way in which 
lobbyists manage to obtain undue access to the officials in question. 
The most publicized lobbying scandal in recent years has been tied to Jack Abramoff, 
Representative Tom DeLay and other Republican politicians. This case, however, was only one more 
in the line of many previous ones. 
6 The first of several lobbying restrictions on the federal level came as early as 1876, following 
the Credit Mobilier railway scandal. The resolution adopted by the House obliged all persons or 
corporations engaged in lobbying to be registered with the Clerk of the House. This resolution, 
however, was valid only for the Forty-fourth Congress and its duration was not extended. 
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to be answered by the legislative branch in the form of regulative efforts, most 
notably prohibition or disclosure7. Even if these efforts often fail to achieve the 
expected results, they might impose threats to the constitutionally guaranteed right 
to petition the government8, a right in close conjunction with other First 
Amendment rights closely related to lobbying: the freedom of speech and the press 
and the right of assembly or association9. 
Lobbying regulation seems to be a never-ending task and a necessary one as 
such, especially in light of recent lobbying scandals10. Despite the inevitability of 
lobbying restrictions and reform, there remains the fundamental question: is there a 
constitutional right to lobby in the United States? The question has been hanging in 
the air for the entire 20th century history of lobbying and the most adequate actor to 
answer the question, the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to do so up to this point. 
Not that the issue hasn't been raised before the Court yet". Indeed, lobbying has 
been on the Supreme Court's table several times, both directly and indirectly. 
Nevertheless the Court has been extremely hesitant in the treatment of the question 
and this is rather telling about its ambiguous relationship to the issue of lobbying 
rights. The core of the issue is whether a constitutional right to lobby can be 
derived from the First Amendment rights of petition, free speech and press and the 
right of assembly. Of these rights the right of petition concerns us the most, 
together with the right of assembly as these rights are the most often invoked in 
cases disputing the constitutionality of lobbying restrictions12. If a constitutional 
right to lobby can be derived from the above mentioned First Amendment rights, it 
would not make all lobbying restrictions unconstitutional at once but it would 
7 Prohibition usually means a legal ban on certain lobbying activities, most typically on gifts, 
meals, entertainments or providing means of travel (such as private jets) for elected officials. The ban 
can be an overall or a conditional one (one which only bans activities over a certain limit). Disclosure 
on the other hand does not mean a ban; it means exposure of certain information to the larger public. 
Outright bans have been very rare up to these days but especially in light of recent lobbying scandals, 
prohibitions are being reconsidered. Nevertheless disclosure is still the main method for regulating 
lobbying. 
8 The right of petition is a right guaranteed by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution: 
„Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances". U.S. Const.amend.I. 
9 For full text of the First Amendment, see supra note 8. 
10 See supra note 5. 
" The U.S. Supreme Court has examined the question of a right to lobby mostly indirectly, that is 
through examining the right to petition and the right of association most notably in Trist v. Child 88 
U.S. (21 Wall.)441 (1874), Rumely v. United States 345 U.S. 41 (1953), United States v. Harriss 347 
U.S. 612 (1954), Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight 365 U.S. 127 
(1961), Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington 461 U.S. 540 (1983), Buckley v. Valeo 
424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
12 See Rumely v. United States 345 U.S. 41 (1953), United States v. Harriss 347 U.S. 612 (1954), 
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight 365 U.S. 127 (1961), Regan v. 
Taxation with Representation of Washington 461 U.S. 540 (1983), NAACP v. Alabama 357 U.S. 449 
(1958). 
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definitely pose a burden - and not necessarily a disadvantageous one - on the 
legislature to take into account the constitutional implications of planned anti-lobby 
measures. 
Naturally lobbying cannot be considered a uniquely Anglo-American 
phenomenon, despite the fact that the profession has reached its greatest heights in 
the United States and has grown together with American democracy and 
government13. Although the two seem to be inseparable, this doesn't make 
lobbying a solely American institution. Lobbying or public policy advocacy has 
made its appearance on the European stage for quite a while now14. Few would 
argue that lobbying is a profession in the U.S. but there is a growing number of 
people who think the same about European lobbying and rightly so. European 
lobbyists have grown enormously in number15 and their techniques have generally 
become more sophisticated and diverse. They might have learnt from their 
American counterparts but European lobbying at large has stayed, well, European 
in style16. Nevertheless it is undeniable that lobbying in Europe should always keep 
a watchful eye on the development of its American counterpart, especially in light 
of recent European Union and separate member state efforts to regulate the 
profession17. This necessarily makes the topic of this article all the more current in 
Hungary as well, where the first lobbying restrictions were enacted in 200618. 
The first part of this essay will introduce the history of lobbying, whereas the 
second part of the essay focuses on the history of lobbying regulations in the 
United States, with special regard to recent lobbying restrictions19. In part three I 
13 „Lobbying has surely been around as long as there has been government" in THOMAS M. 
SUSMAN: Lobbying in the 21st Century- Reciprocity and the Need for Reform. 58 Admin. L. Rev. 737, 
p. 738. 
14 Lobbying has been on the scene in England from very early on. In the form of petitioning it has 
been a factor to be taken into consideration since the Magna Carta. Since the 17th century lobbying 
has become a profession on its own. Although lobbying in continental Europe does not have the same 
historical traditions as in the Anglo-Saxon world, it has become prominent on the European continent 
especially in the past 50 years. With the creation of the European Union, lobbying has become 
prevalent and it has expanded enormously in its dimensions. The numbers themselves are rather 
telling: In 2000, about 2,600 interest groups had an office in Brussels and by 2003 this number grew 
to 3,000 according to Lobbying in the European Union: Current rules and practices, EP Directorate-
General for Research Constitutional Affairs Series, AFCO 104 EN. 
15 See supra note 14. 
16 Although it might sound like a stereotype, European lobbyists are described as highly efficient 
and respectful. DAVID COEN: Lobbying in the European Union, Directorate-General Internal Policies 
of the Union, Constitutional Affairs, PE 393.266 EN, p. 10. 
17 The European Union has undertaken the task of introducing lobbying legislation in recent 
years. The first steps of this process have already been taken. In May 2008 the European Union 
introduced a code of conduct for lobbyists and in July 2008 the European Commission opened its 
lobby register, both under the umbrella of the European Transparency Initiative, which was launched 
in 2005 with its main objective being the strengthening of public trust in the EU institutions. 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kallas/transparency_en.htm. 
18 Act XLIX. of2006 on Lobbying. 
" Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. 
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shall endeavor to draw a small sketch of the development of the right to petition 
both in England and the United States. Part four will examine the leading 
constitutional cases in the field of lobbying. 
I. 
An early history of lobbying 
Lobbying20 or public policy advocacy is the process of petitioning the government 
to influence public policy^1. Many believe that the word lobby originates in the 
United States, that is, it was first used by President Ulysses S. Grant, who during 
his first term in presidency was a frequent visitor of the lounge of the Willard Hotel 
in Washington D.C. where he enjoyed the pleasure of good whisky and cigar, an 
activity he was not allowed to profess in his home. His secret trips to the Hotel's 
bar soon became well-known around town and those wishing to have a word or two 
with the president petitioning in their own name22 or on behalf of someone else 
would gather in the hotel's lobby to catch the president on his way to and from the 
lounge. President Grant used to call these people "lobbyists", not without a 
pejorative hint. The truth is, however, that the term has earlier roots in English 
parliamentarianism: in 17th century England a large waiting room of the House of 
Commons was called the "lobby"2. 
Wherever though its roots may have been, lobbying has been around for the 
entire history of the United States. As Senator Robert C. Byrd said it in his speech 
about lobbying24: "Lobbyists have been at work from the earliest days of the 
Congress"2 . Indeed as early as the end of the 18th century26, lobbying was a known 
and - obviously under the constraints of the historical backdrop - a widespread 
practice. Not that lobbying was considered an honorable profession or thing to do 
at the time. Public distrust surrounding lobbying was fueled by numerous rumors -
20 The word lobby comes from the Latin word „labium", which means vestibule or hall. 
21 Public citizen: Origins, evolution and structure of the Lobbying Disclosure Act. Available at: 
http://www.cleanupwashington.org/documents/LDAorigins.pdf 
22 Self-lobbyists, people who represent themselves. 
2 3 NICHOLAS W . ALLARD: Lobbying is an Honorable Profession: the Right to Petition and the 
Competition to Be Right, 19 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 23., p.37. 
Robert C. Byrd, Senate Majority Leader in 1980, launched a historical project on March 21, 
1980. Over a decade, he delivered more than a hundred speeches on the history and operations of the 
U.S. Senate. These speeches later became the centerpiece of the Senate's 1989 bicentennial 
commemoration. His speech on lobbyists was delivered on September 28, 1987 and it is available for 
readers at: http://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/Byrd_History_Lobbying.htni 
25 See Robert C. Byrd: supra note 24. 
26 In 1792 William Hull was hired by the Virginia veterans of the continental army to lobby for 
additional compensation for their war services. In the same year Hull wrote to other veterans' groups, 
recommending that their 'agent or agents' cooperate with him during the next session to pass a 
compensation bill. See Robert C. Byrd: Lobbyists. 
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and no point in denying, sometimes more than rumors at the time - such as those 
relating to the Bank of the United States, "the most distrusted and despised special 
interest"27 of its era. There were several senators who also served as the bank's 
directors. One of them, Senator Daniel Webster of Massachusetts wrote the 
following to the bank's director in his infamous letter on December 21, 1833: 
"Since I arrived here, I have had an application to be concerned, professionally, 
against the Bank, which I have declined, of course, although I believe my retainer 
has not been renewed, or refreshed, as usual. If it be wished that my relation to the 
bank should be continued, it may be well to send me the usual retainer."28 This 
quote is a perfect example of the era's less sophisticated lobbying methods. The 
choice of words could even be harsher, of course, as today most people would 
consider this plain corruption. There are several examples of the same genre, of 
which only a few are worthy of mentioning and mainly for their anecdotal value. 
Samuel Colt, for example, the famous gun-maker, gave away free pistols to 
representatives29 in 1850 while seeking passage of his patent bills. This was by no 
means a unique example of Colt's or his counterparts' doings30. As Colt himself 
put it: "To reach the heart or get the vote, the surest way is down the throat"31. 
Indeed it was a common practice to wine and dine elected officials at the time, and 
provide them with company32. Before delivering severe judgment on the character 
of elected officials of the era, it is worth noting that at the time Washington D.C. 
was not the bustling capital that it is today. The Washington D.C. of the epoch was 
suffering heavily from a harsh climate and was severely lacking in cultural and 
social amenities. Congressmen usually stayed in the nation's capital without their 
families and lived and dined in comfort-lacking boarding houses. It doesn't come 
as a surprise that the so-called "social lobby"33 was live and flourishing at the time. 
From the middle of the 19th century railroad and tariff lobby34 became 
significant, which naturally lead to an increase in the number of Washington 
lobbyists35.The Civil War had a similar effect36. Around this time it became 
customary to hire more than one agent to act on one's behalf, even though no 
27 See Robert C. Byrd: supra note 24. 
28 See Robert C. Byrd: supra note 24. 
29 At one time Samuel Colt gave a pistol to the 12 year old son of a representative. See Robert C. 
Byrd supra note 24. 
30 See Robert C. Byrd: supra note 24. 
31 See supra note 30. 
32 Colt himself used three ladies to entertain elected officials, who were known as the Spiritualists 
and there were also ladies of less spiritual nature, known as the Chicks. They were also to be found in 
the company of elected officials. 
33 See Robert C. Byrd: supra note 24. 
3 4 JARICA B . NIPPER: Lobbying the Lobbyists: A Comparative Analysis of the Lobbying Regulatory 
and Disclosure Models of the United States and European Union. 14 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 339, 
p. 343. 
35 See Robert C. Byrd: supra note 24. 
36 See Robert C. Byrd: supra note 24. 
1 2 6 OLiVIA RADICS 
results could have been guaranteed37. This latter aspect, might I add, hasn't 
changed over time even if it appears otherwise. The growing number of lobbyists 
and lobby-related affairs came together with scandals erupting from time to time, 
especially in conjunction with railroad subsidies38. Times like these have their own 
heroes or anti-heroes, such as Sam Ward, self-depicted "King of the Lobby"39, who 
made a noteworthy self-confessing testimony in front of a congressional 
committee: "This business of lobbying, so called, is as precarious as fishing in the 
Hebrides.(...) I am not ashamed - I do not say that I am proud, but I am not 
ashamed - of the occupation. It is a very useful one. In England it is a separate 
branch of the legal profession"40. 
Despite the numerous scandals of the time, lobbying was already a profession 
by then, employing a lot of the practices that are in use even today41. It is also 
worth noting that more than once the lobbyists of the 19th century provided highly 
useful services to elected officials42. Their amazing growth in number came around 
the time the United States underwent a significant economic growth and the federal 
government started to expand its powers43. The multitude of issues that elected 
37 See Robert C. Byrd: supra note 24. 
38 The most famous scandal of the time was that in relation to Crédit Mobilier and the 
construction of the Union Pacific railroad. Union Pacific, the railroad company acquired Crédit 
Mobilier of America, a construction company in 1864 and Crédit Mobilier won the contract of 
constructing a large part of the railroad. So basically Union Pacific was paying itself from 
government firnds to pay the railroad instead of paying outside contractors. The Crédit Mobilier 
charged the railroad millions of dollars more than the actual cost of construction: this surplus 
naturally went into the pocket of Pacific Union's bosses and the stockholders of Crédit Mobilier. The 
president of the company was Congressman Oakes Ames from Massachussets. He discouraged 
congressional investigations of the company by passing out stocks to elected officials. The stocks 
were sold for less than market value. By the time the railroad was finished, Union Pacific and its 
stockholders were nearly bankrupt. The scandal broke out in 1872 when the New York Sun published 
an article about it. The public outcry forced out a congressional investigation but a large number of 
those involved in the scandal, including future president James A. Garfield, escaped punishment. See: 
Andrew P. Thomas, supra note 1, p. 151., Edward Winslow Martin: "A Complete and Graphic 
Account of the Crédit Mobilier Investigation" from "Behind the Scenes in Washington", The 
Continental Publishing Company and National Publishing Co. 1873, 
http://cprr.org/Museum/Credit_Mobilier_1873.html. 
3 9 HAJDÚ NÓRA: Lobbi és és demokrácia az Egyesült Államokban. Politikatudományi Szemle 
2002.3-4., p. 141. 
40 See Robert C. Byrd: supra note 24. 
41 Robert C. Byrd: „Some of the lobbying techniques of the Gilded Age were not unlike those of 
today, with speeches supplied, analyses prepared, opposition arguments suggested, personal contacts 
with key members, appearances before committees, and grassroots campaigns created by lobbyists.". 
In Robert C. Byrd: supra note 24. 
42 Lobbyists drafted speeches for Congressmen, prepared analyses, made propositions and 
presentations to elected officials. 
43 This phase in American history is often called the Gilded Age, which signifies a time of large 
economic growth in U.S. history (from the second half of the 19th century until the first decades of the 
20th century). Parallel to this, the federal government started to face a variety of new issues, which it 
decided to take on. 
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officials were obliged to face - without the help of today's sizeable professional 
staffs - came together with a multitude of interests that all wanted to be heard and 
wanted access to the members of both houses. These developments lead to a shift 
in the way lobbying was practiced in Washington D.C.: professional lobbyists took 
over the place of self-representing lobbyists44. This shift naturally caused the 
sophistication of techniques and we can say that the weaponry of today's lobbying 
profession was in large part formed in this period45. A lot of the techniques that are 
widespread and accepted today were surrounded by great suspicion at the time, 
which partly lead to the bad reputation that lobbyists of the 19th century "enjoyed". 
Despite the public's distrust towards lobbyists, they started to grow in number and 
experience, which was in no small ways due to the above-mentioned fact, namely 
that a growing number of interests wanted to find their way to the federal 
government46. Lobbying became an important factor, one to be taken into 
consideration, in governance47. It had always been this way in the United States but 
no doubt in a different form48. Nevertheless we can safely say that public policy 
advocacy first reached a whole new dimension around the end of the 19th century. 
Maybe not exactly the dimension that the Founding Fathers49 imagined for their 
newborn country , but definitely a never before seen phase. 
II. 
Regulative efforts 
As lobbying became a factor to be taken into consideration more than ever before, 
the need to regulate it emerged for the first time partly in response to the public 
44 Lobbyists who represented their own interests and usually came up to the capítol only to 
present their case and then went back home. Lobbyists of this kind were necessarily less effective 
than professional agents. They did not disappear altogether but their number was certainly reduced 
over the past century. 
45 See Robert C. Byrd supra note 24. 
46 Naturally the situation was similar on state level but it is not the subject of this article to 
examine lobbying at the state level. 
47 In 1888 lobbying was defined in the American political dictionary. HAJDÚNÓRA: supra note 36, 
p. 141. 
48 Namely through the right of petition, which has been in practice since the first days of the 
young republic. Self-lobby is also a more direct form of public policy advocacy. 
49 According to some, the Founding Fathers were their era's most prominent lobbyists. ANDREW 
P.THOMAS: p. 1 8 5 . 
so One of the best sources of knowing what the Founding Fathers imagined as a future for the 
United States is The Federalist papers, a series of 85 articles written in order to advocate the 
ratification of the U.S. Constitution and also give a guideline for its future interpretation. The articles 
were written under the pseudonym Publius (in honor of Publius Valerius Publicóla) by James 
Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay and they give a unique perspective on how the Founders 
wished to construe the Constitution. 
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distrust and suspicion that surrounded the institution. In 1876 the House required 
all lobbyists to register with the clerk of the House51. In 1879 lobbyists pretending 
to be journalists were denied access to the press galleries in the Senate and the 
House chambers52. These first restrictions did not cease to be in effect up to this 
day53. Partly as a response to the Crédit Mobilier scandal a 1875 Senate Bill 
proposed registration for lobbyists54. Although the bill didn't pass, in only a year's 
time the House adopted a resolution which required the registering of all lobbyists 
with the Clerk of the House55. However promising this bill was, its effect only 
extended to the Forty-fourth Congress and was not renewed after that56. 
The beginning of the 20th century brought with itself more determined 
legislation concerning lobbyists57, in part as a response to the emergence and 
starting dominance of large corporations and trusts on the lobbying scene58. Part of 
the process of regulating lobbyists was that committee meetings became open to 
the public. Open committee meetings seem like a natural thing to be in the age of 
C-Span but at the time making them open was a huge step in reinforcing public 
trust in Congress. In 1928 the Senate passed a bill which would have mandated 
lobbyists to register and file monthly financial statements but the House didn't 
approve the bill. The first federal disclosure statute, the Public Utility Holding 
Act59, was adopted by Congress in 1935, followed by the Merchant Marine Act60 in 
1936. Both acts envisioned disclosure requirements for lobbyists but their scope 
was naturally limited. The Foreign Agents Registration Act61 was enacted two 
years later and it mandated all agents working for a foreign principal to register 
with the Attorney general and file periodic statements with the State Department62. 
The Foreign Agents Registration Act is still in effect today and requires lobbyists 
working for a foreign principal to disclose the name, address and ownership of all 
principals together with detailed financial accounts63. Obviously the scope of this 
51 See Robert C. Byrd supra note 24. 
5 2 ANDREW P. THOMAS: supra note 1., p. 152. 
53 See Robert C Byrd supra note 24. 
54 The bill would have required attorney representing clients before the House and the Senate to 
be registered by the Congress. ANDREW P. THOMAS: supra note 1., p. 152. 
SEE ANDREW P. THOMAS: supra note 1., p. 152. 
5 6 SEE ANDREW P. THOMAS: supra note 1., p. 152. 
57 Even if regulation didn't always pass, the determination was there. The first U.S. President to 
call in arms against lobbying was President Woodrow Wilson, who made lobby reform and the fight 
against corruption a campaign issue in the presidential election of 1911. 
58 The most well-known trusts of the time included Standard Oil, American Tobacco, U.S. Steel. 
Robert C. Byrd: supra note 24. 
59 49 Stat. 838 (1935). The statute mandated all persons employed by a registered trading 
company to file a disclosure statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
49 Stat. 1985, 2014 (1936). The statute prescribed a disclosure requirement for lobbyists 
representing companies holding construction or operating subsidies. 
61 52 Stat. 631. 
62 The Act's actual agenda was to discover the workings of Nazi symphatizers. 
63 Andrew P. Thomas: supra note 1., p. 153. 
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act was limited as well and the need for comprehensive lobbying regulation 
persisted. Even more so as lobbying went through an amazing development in the 
beginning of the 20th century64. It seems like that the Gilded Age65 was indeed 
Gilded66 for the lobbyists. As I have mentioned earlier, starting from the second 
half of the 19th century, lobbyists became more prepared, their methods evolved 
and they generally became more sophisticated and diverse than ever before67. From 
the early 1900's technology's new inventions revolutionized lobbying: with the 
introduction of new tools like the telephone or the radio lobbyists became able to 
reach a much larger pool of constituents. This development revolutionized 
grassroots lobbying68, a factor usually not taken into account by any legislative 
measures. 
At the same time the legislative branch did not give up the attempts at 
regulating lobbying. The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946 was once 
again an effort to introduce registration requirements for lobbyists - without 
significant success. This act was the first comprehensive federal lobbying reform 
legislation in the U.S. The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act did not actually 
"regulate" lobbying69 in the sense that it only prescribed registration and disclosure 
rules for those engaged in lobbying but didn't actually limit the activity itself. 
According to the Act, a lobbyist is "any person ...who by himself, or through any 
agent or employee or other person in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly, 
solicits, collects, or receives money or any other thing of value to be used 
principally to aid, or the principal purpose of which is to aid, in the 
accomplishment" of the "passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress" or 
who directly or indirectly influence the passage or defeat of such legislation70. 
Those who qualified lobbyists under this description had a duty to register with the 
Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate71. The lobbyists who fell under 
64 This fascinating development was mainly due to the innovative technologies that became 
common in this period. 
65 See supra note 42. The expression „the Gilded Age" has connotations in American literature as 
well. Mark Twain co-wrote a novel with Charles Dudley Warner of the title: The Gilded Age. A Tale 
of Today, 1873. The novel depicts post-Civil War life in the United States, with special regard to the 
corruption in Washington D.C. The term "Gilded Age" which came to signify the era so well, 
originally came from the title of this book. 
66 „Gilded Age" as opposed to „Golden Age", the former being of lesser value than the latter is 
another common interpretation of both the novel by Mark Twain and the epoch's denomination. 
67 See supra note 24. 
68 Grassroots lobbying is lobbyist-initiated citizen participation in government. Lobbyists enter 
into contact with the citizens (through the media, telephone, or mail) and tiy to convince them to 
participate in large volume telephone or letter campaigns to elected officials. Being able to generate 
grassroots support can be rather convincing for elected officials and add enormous strength and 
support to the lobbyist's agenda as "votes are the ultimate currency in politics". KRISHNAKUMAR: 
supra note 2., p. 549. 
6 9 ANDREW P. THOMAS: supra note 1., p. 154. 
70 2 U.S.C.§ 266. 
71 2 U.S.C. § 267 (a). 
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this obligation had to provide the following information: "his name and business 
address, the name and address of the person by whom he is employed, and in 
whose interest he appears or works, the duration of such employment, how much 
he is paid and is to receive, by whom he is paid or to be paid, how much he is to be 
paid for his expenses, and what expenses are to be included"72. Besides these 
pieces of information lobbyists had a duty to file quarterly reports with the Clerk of 
the House and the Secretary of the Senate. These quarterly reports had to contain 
the following information: "a detailed report under oath of all money received and 
expended by him... in carrying on his work; to whom paid; for what purposes; and 
the names of any papers, periodicals, magazines, or other publications in which he 
has caused to be published any articles or editorials; and the proposed legislation 
he is employed to support or oppose73. Another additional quarterly report was to 
be filed with the Clerk of the House the contents of which were: the name and 
address of the contributors of more than $500 to the lobbyist; the exact amount of 
the contributions and a detailed account of expenditures made on behalf of 
contributors74. The lobbyists also had to identify all those for whom they expended 
$10 or more75. 
The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act was at last the piece of legislation long 
awaited: an act wholly and solely devoted to the regulation of lobbying. 
Unfortunately it was also an act destined for failure. Indeed, the Act "has been 
called one of the most poorly drawn laws of all time"76 and it had been severely 
criticized by journalists even before it was enacted77. The main target of the 
criticism was the Act's somewhat ambiguous language, especially when defining 
who a lobbyist is. The question of the Act's constitutionality (due to its ambiguity) 
was bound to end up before the Supreme Court78 sooner or later. The first direct 
challenge arrived with United States v. Harriss79 eight years after the enactment of 
the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act. 
Despite the constitutional challenges against the Act, it remained in effect until 
the mid-90's. There had been attempts at amending it earlier in the 70's but they 
were destined to fail mainly because the legislature itself was not prepared to face 
the issue. Following a number of failed bills, the Federal Regulation of Lobbying 
Act was finally replaced by a new Act, the Lobbying Disclosure of Act of 1995. 
72 2 U.S.C. § 267. 
73 2 U.S.C. § 267. 
74 2 U.S.C. § 264. 
75 2 U.S.C. § 265(a). 
76 Lester W. Milbrath in. ANDREW P. THOMAS: supra note 1. at p. 154 . 
7 7 ANDREW P. THOMAS: supra note 1., p. 154 . 
78 This happened even before the Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, which was created by 
the House, operated under Congressman Frank Buchanan and was charged with the investigations of 
the Act's deficiencies, was able to finish its task. 
79 United States v. Harriss 347 U.S. 612 (1954). 
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The incentive for the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995 came from Bill 
Clinton in the 1992 presidential campaign80. The objective of the Act was to fight 
against corruption in the government but once again Congress managed to enact a 
law that had its share of shortcomings. If it hadn't been so, lobby reform would not 
be of such utmost importance and urgency even these days. Despite the Act's high-
aspiring preamble81 the LDA failed to achieve its aims. As its title suggests, the Act 
introduced disclosure requirements for lobbyists. These mandate lobbyists to fill 
out forms created by the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate. The 
forms require lobbyists to list the name, address, and principal place of business of 
the registering lobbying firm, the client on whose behalf the firm has or will 
engage in lobbying and of any affiliated organization that has contributed more 
than $10,000 towards the lobbying firm's lobbying activities and furthermore of 
any foreign entities that hold at least 20% ownership in the client or one of its 
affiliated organizations82. The Act doesn't require lobbyists to name the 
government officials they lobby83, which is one of the main shortcomings of the 
act: it concentrates solely on the lobbyists and elected officials are left outside the 
scope of the act despite the fact that those who are lobbied form an equally 
important part of the lobby process as those whose lobby. This way of approaching 
the issue disregards the fact that the public is more concerned about the behavior of 
elected officials than lobbyists84. After all lobbyists - contrary to congressmen, 
who can and are held accountable for their doings during their term in office - do 
not have any responsibility towards the public, besides adhering to at least a 
minimum standard of honor85. The Act (and its maker, the Congress) fails to take 
account of the fact that the public distrust around lobbying mainly stems from the 
fear that lobbyists, professional agents have the kind of access to politicians, 
elected officials that average citizens might not have86. In the multitude of interests 
and voices, which is naturally a burden on the officials as well and makes it 
difficult for them to filter the voices or opinions that are indeed worthy of hearing, 
the voices and interests of average citizens can be and are sometimes lost. The 
8 0 ANITA S. KRISHNAKUMAR: supra note 2., p. 518. 
81 According to the Act's preamble the basis of the new law is three congressional findings, 
namely that "responsible representative government requires public awareness of the efforts of paid 
lobbyists to influence the public decision-making process of the Federal government", that "existing 
lobbying disclosure statutes have been ineffective because of unclear statutory language (and) weak 
administrative and enforcement provisions" and that "effective public disclosure of the identity and 
extent of the efforts of paid lobbyists to influence Federal officials (would) increase public confidence 
in the integrity of the Government". 2 U.S.C. § 1601. 
82 2 U.S.C. § 1603. 
83 2 U.S.C. § 1604 (b). 
8 4 SEE ANITA S . KRISHNAKUMAR: supra note 2., p. 519. 
85 According to Anita S. Krishnakumar „the social contract upon which our government is based 
is not between lobbyists and the public; it is between the public and its elected officials. 
KRISHNAKUMAR: supra note 2., p. 525. 
86 KRISHNAKUMAR: supra note 2., p. 525. 
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Lobbying Disclosure Act would be an incomparably more successful legislative act 
if it took into consideration the actual fears of the public and acted accordingly. 
Disclosure of the names of elected officials who are lobbied, with information 
provided about the time spent with them and the issue discussed with them, would 
make the Act's attempts at true reform far stronger. 
Another feature of the Lobbying Disclosure Act in need of revision is the 
format in which the disclosures are filed by the lobbying agents. The forms filled 
out and submitted by the lobbyists are made available to the public only in hard 
copy format at the Legislative Resource Center at the Senate Office of Public 
Records in the nation's capitol. Only a small part of the forms can be viewed 
online87. This of course makes it very hard for average citizens to review the files 
and maybe cross-reference them88. Indeed it makes it a hard task for anyone, except 
for maybe a small number of determined non-profit political organizations. 
The Act places only a one-year ban on revolving-door lobbying89, which means 
that former members of Congress can start working as lobbyists after a one-year 
cooling-off period, which is not necessarily enough if the objective is to fight 
against unequal access to elected officials90. On the other hand, former elected 
officials dispose of special knowledge and expertise, which can nevertheless be 
used in a beneficial way in the lobbying arena91. 
The Act's enforcement provisions also added to its failure in being an effective 
tool for regulating lobbyists. The Act prescribes a penalty for violation of the 
registration provisions but the fine has an upper limit in the amount of $50,00092. 
This amount is of course high for average citizens and may easily have a deterrent 
effect on them, which is exactly the kind of result that should be avoided by any 
lobby legislation. On the other hand even the maximum amount of the penalty is 
certainly well below anything even closely threatening for big lobbying firms. 
Another problem posed by the enforcement provisions of the Act is that solely the 
United States District Attorney for the District of Columbia has authority to 
prosecute violations of the Act9, who might not be the official best suited for this 
role. We conclude this from the fact that at present no serious investigations are 
87 KRISHNAKUMAR: supra note 2., p. 539. 
88 KRISHNAKUMAR: supra note 2., p. 520. 
89 Revolving-door lobbying is when former elected officials, congressmen having left office 
return to the same offices but in a different role: as lobbyists. Revolving door lobbying raises the issue 
of undue access once again as former members are obviously able to use their connections to promote 
the causes they lobby for. This is usually one of the main reasons why they are hired. Revolving door 
lobbying is not always harmful; former members are able to put their much-needed expertise to a 
hopefully good use. Also, as Thomas Susman mentioned, revolving door lobbying mitigates the "us v. 
them" feeling among elected officials. THOMAS M. SUSMAN: supra note 13., p. 743. 
90 KRISHNAKUMAR: supra note 2., p. 526. 
9 1 THOMAS M. SUSMAN: supra note 13, p. 743.. 
92 2 U.S.C. § 1606. 
93 2 U.S.C. § 1605. 
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conducted in order to confirm the validity of the reports filed by lobbyists94. 
Disclosure cannot be serious if it is not checked for validity and if cross-references 
cannot be made. A stricter control system must be introduced in order to ameliorate 
the already existing disclosure pattern. Obviously there is a need for a federal 
agency which oversees the disclosure process and this should be a body distant 
from the legislature itself. That is, previous ideas that the Clerk of the House or the 
Secretary of the Senate would be the motor of enforcement are bound to lead to 
failure95. There is a strong need to appoint a federal agency, which is largely 
independent from the legislature and the executive as well and which would be 
able to check the now rather leniently handled disclosure reports submitted by 
lobbyists with the necessary scrutiny. This seems to be inevitable if Congress 
wishes lobbying regulation to be effective at all. 
Another important factor that has to be taken into account is grassroots 
lobbying, i.e. direct citizen participation in public policy. Grassroots lobbying has 
become a significant factor in politics, one that should not be underestimated96. 
Despite this grassroots lobbying has managed to stay out of the scope of lobby 
regulations so far. 
The Lobbying Disclosure Act despite its shortcomings is still in effect today. It 
is not, however, the last in the federal legislature's attempts at a comprehensive 
lobby reform. In 2005 Congress adopted the Special Interest Lobbying and Ethics 
Accountability Act of 2005 (SILEAA)97 , which was followed by the Lobbying 
Transparency and Accountability Act of 2005 (LTAA)98, and the Legislative 
Transparency and Accountability Act of 200799. The above-mentioned acts were 
styled as amendments to the Lobbying Disclosure Act100. This also means that none 
of the above acts show enough bravery to attempt to truly reform the current way 
in which lobbying works. The core of the problem seems to be that both previous 
and current legislation only aims to handle the situation on a superficial level by 
putting on a showcase for the public but failing to introduce long-lasting and 
effective methods to address the most worrisome concern of lobbying; namely 
94 KRISHNAKUMAR: supra note 2., p. 554. 
9SThese bodies are too close to the fire to put it simply. 
96 As grassroots lobbying falls outside the scope of mandatory disclosure, it is very hard to 
estimate how much is spent on it. A study by the Annenberg Public Policy Center shows that during 
the 1996 election cycle $135-150 million was spent on grassroots lobbying, in the 1997-98 election 
cycle this amount went up to $250-341 million and reached and surpassed $500 million in the 1999-
2000 election cycle. These amounts and their continuous rise shows that grassroots lobby has become 
a significant factor. Underestimating it would be a gross mistake. WILLIAM V . LUNEBURG, THOMAS 
M. SUSMAN: Lobbying Disclosure: A Recipe for Reform. 33 J. Legis.32, p. 44. 
97 Special Interest Lobbying and Ethics Accountability Act of 2005, H.R. 2412. (109th Congress). 
98 Lobbying Transparency and accountability Act of 2005, S. 2128 (109th Congress). 
99 Legislative Transparency and Accountability Act of 2007, S. 1 (110th Congress). 
100 ANITA S. KRISHNAKUMAR: supra note 2., p. 515. 
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unequal access to public officials, quid pro quo or reciprocity arrangements101 and 
possibilities for corruption. Besides any thorough lobbying reform should focus on 
the members of Congress as well, together with their staff members. 
The need for comprehensive and effective lobbying reform prevails but any 
reform attempts should keep in mind that restricting lobbying can limit the right to 
petition guaranteed by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
III. 
The Right to Petition the Government 
England 
The right to petition the government for a redress of grievances appears in the First 
Amendment of the U. S. Constitution102, together with the freedom of speech and 
the press and the right of association. Today these rights are treated as being 
inseparable. "The right to petition is cut from the same cloth as the other 
guarantees of that Amendment, and is an assurance of a particular freedom of 
expression" declared the U.S. Supreme Court in McDonald v. Smith103. That is, in 
the Supreme Court's interpretation the right of petition is not a distinctive right 
from the other expressive rights but only one aspect of the same issue. Historically, 
however, the right of petition was very much a separate right from the above 
mentioned rights and in actual fact enjoyed greater protection than those104 and 
may even be characterized as the likely source of all the expressive rights105 
When we say that lobbying has been around as long as there has been 
government106, it is the right of petition that we talk about. The right of petition is 
101 Quid pro quo or reciprocity arrangements or even the appearance of them cause more harm to 
lobbying than most politicians or lobbyists think as they enormously decrease the public trust in 
elected officials. The key here is that even if there is nothing actually improper going on, the 
appearance of impropriety is more than enough as what the public fears the most is that lobbyists 
somehow get the kind of access to members of Congress that is otherwise not available to average 
citizens. It is also worth noting that gifts, meals, entertainment, campaign contributions might make 
elected officials, even if they do not think so, bestowed to lobbyists, which might actually lead these 
officials to return the favors received and this is definitely improper. 
See Vincent R. Johnson: Regulating Lobbyists: Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, 16 Cornell J.L. & 
Pub. Pol'y 1, p. 22. 
102 See supra note 8. 
103 McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985). 
1 0 4 JULIE M. SPANBAUER: The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of 
Grievances: Cut from a Different Cloth. 21 Hastings Const. L. Q. 15, p. 17. 
1 0 5 NORMAN B . SMITH: „Shall Make No Law Abridging... ": An Analysis of the Neglected, but 
Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition. 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1153., p. 1153. 
106 „Lobbying has surely been around as long as there has been government itself' in. THOMAS M. 
SUSMAN: supra note, p. 738. 
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one of the most ancient political rights, which in the Anglo-American tradition can 
be traced back to the Magna Carta (1215), in which the King of England granted 
the right of petition to the barons in writing for the first time1 7. This early right of 
petition was by no means a strong right10 but nevertheless from 1215 it became 
customary to present petitions to the King. These petitions were either presented by 
the petitioners themselves or by their representatives and they were usually heard 
(not necessarily granted) by the King in exchange for financial contributions made 
to the crown1 . This custom slowly lead to the development of the English 
parliament110. By the 14th century it was customary that the King listened to 
petitions presented by the people for themselves or on behalf of others at the 
beginning of every opening session in the parliament111. At this time there was no 
significant difference between petitions of a more private and of a more political 
nature112 and petitions were presented on behalf of both individuals and 
communities. The petitioning of the era had two aspects: legislative and judicial or 
quasi-judicial113. These aspects did not separate clearly for a lengthy period114. It is 
worth noting that due to this dual function, petitioning played an important part in 
litigation as well115. This comes as no surprise as the three branches of the 
government did not separate clearly at the time116. Naturally for us it is the right of 
individual petitioning is what matters. In its later history, especially later on in the 
American colonies, the quasi-judicial function of the right to petition became 
meaningless. 
Although a right of several aspects, the right of petition was not a particularly 
strong right at first as the decision to hear petitions was still somewhat within the 
King's discretion. Not even the appearance of the parliament as the other main 
actor on the political stage brought a significant change in this. The parliament in 
107 „If we, our justiciar, or our bailiffs or any of our officers, shall in anything be at fault toward 
anyone, or shall have broken any one of the articles of the peace or of this security, and the offences 
be notified to four barons of the five-and-twenty, the said barons shall repair to us (or our justiciar, if 
we are out of the realm) and, laying the transgression before us, petition to have the transgression 
redressed without delay". In http://www.britannia.com/histoty/docs/magna2.html 
1 0 8 JULIE M . SPANBAUER: supra note 104., p. 22. 
1 0 9 JULIE M. SPANBAUER: supra note 104., p. 22. 
1 1 0 JULIE M. SPANBAUER: supra note 104., p. 22. 
111 NORMAN B. SMITH: supra note 105., p. 1155. 
112 „In this period, laws proposed by parliament, just like individual grievances, were presented in 
the form of petitions to the king". See NORMAN B. SMITH: supra note 105. p. 1156. 
113 See Julie M. Spanbauer, supra note 104., p. 23. 
114 Not until the 16th century when legislation stopped being initiated by petitions. 
115 Litigation in the Court of Chancery, the Court of the Exchequer, the Court of the Common 
Pleas and the Court of the King's Bench was initiated by petition. JULIE M. SPANBAUER: supra note 
104., p. 24. 
1 1 6 JULIE M . SPANBAUER: supra note 104 . , p. 2 4 . 
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no small ways abused the right of petition the same way as the King"7. Petitioners 
were sometimes even punished for submitting their requests118; fortunately by the 
beginning of the 18th century, this phenomenon ceased to exist119. It is important, 
however, to make a distinction between punishing the petitioner (by imprisonment) 
and not granting the favorable reception of the petition. Granting a favorable 
reception was never a part of the right of petition. Without further detailing the 
historical lineage of the development of the right of petition in England, let it be 
enough to conclude that by the 18th century the right of petition was indeed a right, 
its practice ceased to be punished and it was a recognized form of expressing 
individual grievances to the government asking for a redress. Most of the times 
petitioning was not only permitted, but even successful120 and therefore it was 
frequently practiced. 
The American Colonies 
The right of petition, as shown above, was an established right in England by the 
time the American colonies came into existence. The Body of Liberties adopted by 
Massachusetts Bay Colony was the first colonial code to establish the right of 
petition in the overseas colonies121 and this was only the first in a row of several 
other colonial codes which all contained similar provisions122. This clearly shows 
that the right of petition in the colonies was present from the earliest days. In actual 
fact, the right of petition was already engraved in the minds of the first settlers of 
the new colony, it was an asset they had brought with themselves on the long road 
across the Atlantic. This background naturally preset the main characteristics of the 
development of the petitioning right in what was not so much later to become the 
United States of America. Petitioning was an accepted way for individuals to 
approach their respective government. Petitioners were able to exercise their right 
to submit a written request for a redress of grievances without fear of possible 
1,7 The parliament was able to exercise the same kind of control over petitions as the King was 
able to. This was mostly due to the fact that the right to hear petitions never included the right to grant 
their favorable reception by either the king or the parliament. 
118 JULIE M . SPANBAUER: supra note 104 . , p. 2 6 . 
1 1 9 JULIE M . SPANBAUER: supra note 104. , p. 2 7 . 
1 2 0 NORMAN B. SMITH: supra note 105, p. 1166. 
121 „Every man whether Inhabitant or Foreigner, free or not free, shall have liberty to come to any 
public Court, Council or Town meeting, and either by speech or writing, to move any lawful, 
seasonable or material Question, or to present any necessary Motion, Complaint, Petition, Bill or 
Information, whereof that Meeting hath proper cognizance, for it be done in convenient time, due 
Order and respective Manner". The Colonial Laws of Massachusetts in NORMAN B. SMITH: supra note 
109., p. 1170. 
125 Delaware (1776), New Hampshire (1783), Vermont (1777), North Carolina (1776), 
Pennsylvania (1776) all adopted codes ensuring protection for those petitioning for a redress of 
grievances. JULIE M. SPANBAUER: supra note 104., p. 28. 
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punishment123. Naturally, favorable treatment of petitions was not granted but the 
right of petition included the right to a response124. 
As the Revolution drew near, the right of petition became an especially 
treasured and meaningful right, one which gained affirmation in a number of pre-
revolutionary documents, such as the Declaration of Rights and Grievances1 or 
the Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress126, which set the 
tune for the to-be adopted Constitution. The right to petition, similarly to other 
individual rights, was not included in the original text of the Constitution but 
formed part of the first of the ten amendments that were drafted in order to amend 
the Constitution and which are known as the Bill of Rights. 
First Amendment 
The Bill of Rights, a comprehensive name by which we mean the first ten 
amendments of the United States Constitution, was proposed to the House of 
Representatives by James Madison. In the original draft presented by Madison, the 
right of petition and assembly was separate from the right of speech and religion: 
"The people shall not be restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for 
their common good; nor from applying to the legislature by petitions, or 
remonstrances for redress of grievances"127. The original text was reviewed by both 
the House of Representatives and the Senate and after a few modifications was 
adopted in its present form128: "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances"1. 
It is worth noting that neither in England nor in the American colonies did the 
right of free speech and press enjoy the same amount of support and recognition as 
the right of petition. The former two had a much less successful history. Seditious 
libel130 and treason rules were the most notable restrictions on the freedom of 
123 Except for meritless petitions which were to be punished by fines in several of the colonies. 
These restrictions, however, did not aim to limit petitioning or the content of petitioning. 
1 2 4 JULIE M. SPANBAUER: 104., supra note, p. 33. 
125 „It is the right of the British subjects in these colonies to petition the King or either House of 
Parliament". In http://www.constitution.org/bcp/dor_sac.htm. 
126 That they have a right peaceably to assemble, consider of, their grievances, and petition the 
king; and that all prosecutions, prohibitory proclamations, and commitments for the same, are 
illegal". In http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/resolves.htm. 
1 2 7 JULIE M. SPANBAUER: supra note 104., pp. 39. 
128 The records suggest that there was a motion to strike "assemble" from the text of the original 
text but the motion was dismissed. The right of petition was often conditioned on the right of 
assembly in those days and the two were viewed as inseparable from each other. 
129 U.S. Const.amend.l. 
130 Seditious libel originated in a 1606 case. Before that libel was a private action for damages. 
JULIE M . SPANBAUER: supra note 104 . , pp. 3 4 - 3 5 . 
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speech and press. The reason for the maltreatment of these rights in comparison to 
the right of petition, was probably that petitioning, if exercised correctly, was much 
less threatening to the government than free speech. Petitions were addressed to 
the government and were directly handled or managed by the government, so it 
was able to exercise control over them by having the right to either dismiss them or 
receive them favorably. The same was not true for the freedom of speech and press, 
which - once exercised - were rather hard to be held under control and therefore 
they were definitely viewed as more dangerous to the status quo that the petitioning 
right. The right of petition was a right widely accepted and practiced in the former 
colonies. It was a right "implied by the very idea of government, republican in 
form"132. 
IV. 
The constitutional right to lobby 
For the non-Anglo-Saxon educated mind the connection between the right to lobby 
and the right to petition may seem a bit far-stretched. Nevertheless in the Anglo-
American culture the right to lobby - if indeed there is such a constitutionally 
guaranteed right - stems from the right to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances, a right that allows every citizen to participate in government. It 
provides the constituents a right to directly or indirectly enter into contact with 
their elected officials and tiy to influence them on a public policy that affects them. 
The right to petition and the right to lobby are - despite their common origins - not 
the same133. The right of petition can be exercised in a number of ways, of which 
lobbying is only one134. The right to lobby also involves the right to free speech 
and press, and the right of assembly135; in fact generally there is no distinction 
made among these rights in the case of lobbying 36 and they are usually handled 
131 Treason was introduced as a crime in a 1332 statute in England and it had to be an overt act 
showing an intent to murder the king or to levy war or to adhere to the king's enemies. Also, any 
writing which showed evidence of these intents was enough to call it an act of treason. JULIE M. 
SPANBAUER: supra note 1 0 4 . , pp. 3 4 - 3 5 . 
132 U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552. 
133 The right to lobby does not appear in the First Amendment, which is no surprise considering 
the term lobbying did not exist at the time the Bill of Rights was framed. But it is without doubt that 
several of the activities that the Founding Fathers themselves exercised would now be considered 
lobbying activities. ANDREW P. THOMAS: supra note 1., p. 185 . 
1 3 4 ANDREW P. THOMAS: supra note 1., p. 184 . 
135 The right of assembly is also called the right of association. It is usually referred to in two 
contexts: intimate relationships, protected by the right of privacy and the freedom of individuals to 
gather in small groups or to unite in large organizations in order to engage in protected First 
Amendment activities. ALLAN IDES AND CHRISTOPHER N . MAY: Constitutional Law, Individual Rights, 
Aspen Law & Business. 2001. p. 363. 
136 In the framework of lobbying, freedom of speech and press are usually used only as techniques 
and their core meaning is not affected. 
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under the same umbrella. It is also worth noting that in the framework of lobbying 
legislation, the freedom of speech and press are usually not affected: lobbyists are 
not limited in the contents of their communication with elected officials and they 
are free to publish whatever they want. They are, however, limited in the amount of 
time they are allowed to communicate with members of the Congress137. That's of 
course a long step from pre-revolutionary times when even the Founding Fathers 
chose to wrote under pseudonyms138. 
The right to lobby involves something more as well. Lobbyists, especially since 
the second half of the 19th century have been more often than not acting as agents 
on other people's behalf; they fulfill (paid or unpaid) surrogate roles for 
individuals . The idea that all lobbyists are evil influence-peddlers, simply does 
not stand. First of all it is a mistake to think that only large corporate interests 
lobby. Nowadays there are more and more interests (and behind these interests 
groups: individuals) who express their views to elected officials through lobbyists. 
Fortunately, the tendency is that more minorities, women and young people 
become engaged in lobbying, either directly or through an agent140. Lobbying is a 
way, a manner in which individuals and interest groups of all kinds can actually 
participate in government. In fact the main task for lobbyists should be to act as an 
active representation of the constituents towards the government141. But despite the 
fact that lobbying is part of the democratic process of citizen participation in 
government, it also has inherent threats of corruption and that's why restrictions of 
some kind seem to be necessary. Any restriction, however, needs to take into 
account the fact that it may have implications on the expressive rights of the First 
Amendment142. Of course, the real question is whether a constitutional right to 
lobby can actually be derived from these rights and the best suited actor to decide 
this question is the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court has been, however, somewhat hesitant in the treatment of 
this issue; not that it has had no opportunities yet to examine it143. The Supreme 
Court first faced the question of lobbying in Trist v Child144, a case from the Gilded 
Age, in which the Supreme Court declared a lobbying contract with an attorney 
137 For some reason lobbying regulations fail to regulate lobbyists' contact with members of the 
executive branch and instead they tend to focus on lobbying in the legislative branch. 
138 The Federalist Papers were written under a pseudonym as well. Because of the restraints on the 
freedom of speech and the press anonymous speech was much treasured in revolutionary America. 
1 3 9 VINCENT R. JOHNSON: supra note 101 . , p. 4 . 
1 4 0 THOMAS M. SUSMAN: supra note 13., p. 742. 
141 JAMES M . DEMARCO: Lobbying the Legislature in the Republic: Why Lobby Reform is 
Unimportant. 8 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 599, p. 613. 
Congress does seem to take into account the constitutional implications of lobbying and 
usually cites the possible implications on the constitutional right to lobby as a reason for the limited 
scope of lobbying restrictions. 
143 Although it is worth noting that despite the fact that lobbying seems to be present at every 
level of government, so far relatively few cases involving lobbying has reached the Supreme Court. 
144 Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 21 Wall. 441 (1874) 
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unenforceable. In the Court's reasoning an "agreement in the present case was for 
the sale of the influence and exertions of the lobby agent to bring about the passage 
of a law for the payment of a private claim, without reference to its merits, by 
means which, if not corrupt, were illegitimate, and considered (...) contrary to the 
plainest principles of public policy"145. The Supreme Court did little to conceal its 
view on lobbying: ""if any of the great corporations of the country were to hire 
adventurers who make market of themselves in this way, to procure the passage of 
a general law with a view to the promotion of their private interests, the moral 
sense of every right-minded man would instinctively denounce the employer and 
employee as steeped in corruption and the employment as infamous"146. This early 
indication of the Supreme Court's view on lobbying made it clear for quite a while 
that lobbying will not enjoy any sort of protection from the federal judiciary. 
Trist v. Child was an early opinion but it nevertheless preset the tone for what 
was to come. Following the first lobbying restrictions, it was inevitable that the 
question of their constitutionality would be raised. The first occasion for this was 
created by the notoriously badly drafted Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act147 in 
Rumely v. United States'48149. The Court examined the scope of the Act, namely 
what constituted a lobbying activity under the Act150. According to the Supreme 
Court's reasoning, if lobbying activities were to be construed broadly, the Federal 
Regulation of Lobbying Act would have to face a serious constitutional challenge 
and therefore "if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal 
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is 
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided"151. Following this principle 
the Court decided to construe the language of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying 
Act narrowly so as to avoid a constitutional issue and decided to use "lobbying in 
its commonly accepted sense" as "representations made directly to the Congress, 
its members, or its committees"152. The Supreme Court, in opting for the more 
limited definition of lobbying activities, limited the scope of the Act as well. Even 
though the Court did not explicitly treat the question of a right to lobby, it 
eventually ended up - although hesitantly - providing some form of constitutional 
protection for it, namely through the First Amendment expressive rights. 
Rumely was not a direct challenge on the constitutionality of the Act and 
neither was the question of lobbying examined in depth by the Court. Nevertheless 
145 Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 21 Wall. 441, p. 451. 
146 Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 21 Wall. 441, p. 451. 
147 See supra note 81. 
148 Rumely v.United States 345 U.S 41 (1953). 
149 In Rumely v. United States Mr. Rumely refused to disclose to a Congressional committee (the 
Buchanan committee) the names of those who made bulk purchases of books of a political nature 
from his organization. The organization engaged in activities which under the Federal Regulation of 
Lobbying Act constituted lobbying. 
The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act did not use the term lobbying activity. 
151 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22. 
152 90 U.S. App. D.C. 382,197 F. 2d 166,175. 
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it became clear that further challenges would arrive. The next attack on the Federal 
Regulation of Lobbying Act's constitutionality came with United States v. 
Harriss153. The question focused on the statute's definition of "lobbying" and who 
was considered a lobbyist under the Act. The Court held that the main question was 
whether the Act "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his 
contemplated conduct is forbidden by statute" 54 or whether the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague and unclear155. The Court turned to Rumely and 
basically applied the same concept that was applied there, namely that the language 
of the act "should be construed to refer only to 'lobbying in its commonly accepted 
sense' - to direct communication with members of Congress on pending or 
proposed federal legislation"156. Thus the Court decided to make "constitutionally 
definite the class of offenses bv a reasonable construction of the language" , 
which is also a duty of the court58. According to this interpretation only those had 
to comply with the disclosure requirements who fulfilled the following three 
criteria: the person must have solicited, collected, or received contributions; one of 
the main (principal) purposes of such person or contributions must have been to 
influence the passage or defeat of legislation by Congress and this must have been 
done through direct communication with members of the Congress on pending or 
proposed legislation159. By construing the act's definition of lobbyist narrowly, the 
Court managed to avoid more serious constitutional implications but at the same 
time excluded a number of activities from the scope of the act, such as grassroots 
lobbying, or lobbying members of the executive branch or self-lobbying1. 
In Harriss the Court also dealt with the issue of lobbying in general (although its 
treatment of the subject was far from exhaustive). In the Court's opinion the 
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act's mandatory disclosure requirements do not 
infringe lobbyists' First Amendment rights as Congress "is not constitutionally 
forbidden to require the disclosure of lobbying activities"161 as these disclosure 
requirements effectively serve Congress' self-protection162. The Court also touched 
the issue of mandatory disclosure requirements having a deterrent effect on those 
wishing to engage in activities falling under the scope of the First Amendment and 
concluded that such danger does not exist although "hypothetical borderline 
situations are conjured up in which such persons choose to remain silent because of 
153 United States v. Harriss 347 U.S. 612 (1954) 
154 United States v. Harriss 347 U.S., 625. 
155 The Court applied "the underlying principle (...) that no man shall be held criminally 
responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed". United States v. 
Harriss 345 U.S., 617. 
156 United States v. Harriss 347 U.S., 620. 
157 United States v. Harriss 347 U.S. 612. 
158 United States v. Harriss 347 U.S. 612. 
159 United States v. Harriss 347, U.S. 612. 
1 5 0 ANDREW P. THOMAS: supra note 1., p. 163. 
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fear of possible prosecution for failure to comply with the act (...) the restraint is, 
at most, an indirect one resulting from self-censorship"163. Thus in Harriss the 
Court found that lobbying restrictions, if constitutionally precise and clear, do not 
infringe upon First Amendment rights. If we reverse this conclusion it is clear, 
however, that despite the Court's overly hesitant admission, lobbying is entitled to 
some form of constitutional protection under the First Amendment, although the 
scope of this protection was not clarified in Harriss and the decision failed to give a 
solid basis for lobbyists to apply for protection under the Constitution. The latter 
was clearly not an intention of the Court anyway. 
Later cases decided by the Supreme Court involving the right to lobby also 
failed to declare the existence of a constitutional right to lobby. In Eastern Railroad 
Presidents Conference v. Noeif Motor Freight164 the Court concluded that in a 
representative government such as the United States the executive and the 
legislative branch of government "act on behalf of the people and, to a very large 
extent, the whole concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people 
to make their wishes known to their representatives"165. The Court also 
acknowledged that "the right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the 
Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to 
invade these freedoms"166. With this latter statement the Supreme Court identified 
the right of petition as the operative right in the lobbying issue and once again 
guaranteed some form of constitutional protection for lobbying. 
In Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington the Supreme Court 
was of the opinion that "Congress did not violate Taxation with Representation of 
Washington's First Amendment rights by declining to subsidize its First 
Amendments activities"168. In his concurring opinion Justice Blackmun, joined by 
Justices Brennan and Marshall, declared that "Because lobbying is protected by the 
First Amendment, (...) §501(c)(3) therefore denies a significant benefit to 
organizations choosing to exercise their constitutional rights' , which, of course, 
violates the principle "that the government may not deny a benefit to a person 
because he exercises a constitutional right"170. Although this seems to be an 
affirmative recognition of a constitutional right to lobby, Regan v. Taxation with 
163 United States v. Harriss 347 U.S., 626. 
164 Eastern R. Conf. v. Noerr Motors, 365 U.S. 127 (1961). A group of trucking companies and 
their trade associations sued for treble damages and injunctive relief against a group of railroads 
charging that the defendants had conspired to restrain trade in, and monopolize, the long-distance 
freight business, in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 
165 Eastern R. Conf. v. Noerr Motors, 365 U.S., 137. 
166 Eastern R. Conf. v. Noerr Motors, 365 U.S., 138. 
167 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540. (1983). Taxation with 
Representation of Washington, a non profit organization filed suit challenging the Internal Revenue 
Code's denial of tax-exempt status to them because of its lobbying activities. 
168 Regan v.Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 548. 
169 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 552. 
170 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S 545. 
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Representation of Washington did not alter the constitutional scene for lobbying, 
mainly as Justice Blackmun failed to detail his declaration and also, because his 
opinion was not part of the majority decision. 
The above cases represent the most important milestones in the treatment of the 
right to lobby in the Supreme Court's practice. Milestones they are, nevertheless 
none of the above cases recognized a right to lobby affirmatively. We can only 
gather fragments of some form of constitutional protection for lobbying from these 
decisions. The situation is somewhat different in associational privacy cases which 
have enjoyed greater support from the Supreme Court. The most important 
associational privacy cases do no involve lobbyists' rights specifically, but 
nevertheless they have proved to be important in drafting a three-pronged test 
which can be applied to statutes limiting constitutional rights (such as the right of 
assembly or the right of petition) and therefore form an important part of lobbying 
caselaw . In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson172 the Court concluded that 
"freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an 
inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.(...) State action 
which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to 
closest scrutiny"173. The Court actually cites Rumely and Harriss in supporting its 
argument174. In NAACP the Court arrived at the conclusion that a state must show 
a controlling interest in the disclosure requirements and it also must prove that 
there is a substantial relationship between the state's interest and the information 
provided by disclosure175. The same two-pronged test was reinforced in Bates v. 
Little Rock176 and was added a third prong in Shelton v. Tucker177, that being the 
"less drastic means doctrine": "even though the governmental purpose be 
legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly 
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be narrowly achieved. The 
breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic means 
for achieving the same basic purpose"178. In yet another associational privacy case, 
Buckley v. Valeo179 the Supreme Court found that the right of association was not 
171 It is also worth noting that associational privacy cases and right to petition cases tend to cite 
and cross-reference each other. It seems like the Supreme Court itself handles the two issues as facets 
of essentially the same topic. 
172 NAACP v. Alabama ex. Rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). NAACP (National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People), a non-profit organization working for the advancement of 
the interests of African-Americans, refused to comply with an Alabama court order requiring 
disclosure of the organization's membership lists. 
173 NAACP v. Alabama ex. Rel. Patterson, 357 U.S., 460. 
174 NAACP v. Alabama ex. Rel. Patterson, 357 U.S., 461. 
175 NAACP v. Alabama ex. Rel. Patterson, 357 U.S., 463-464. 
176 Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) 
177 Shelton v. Tucker 364 U.S. 479. (1960) 
178 Shelton v. Tucker 364 U.S. 479.488. 
179 Buckley v. Valeo 424 U.S. 1 (1976) 
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an absolute right and that the three-pronged test previously applied was a balancing 
test and it allowed for even a "significant interference with protected rights of 
political associations"180 in case the state can actually show a sufficiently important 
interest. 
Although none of the above cases dealt expressly with lobbying rights, its 
implications on the right of petition, another fundamental right guaranteed by the 
First Amendment, are undeniable. If the Supreme Court were to remain consistent 
with its opinions in associational privacy cases, the same three-pronged test is to be 
applied to lobbying statutes as well. But then again, it is worth noting that the 
difference in the Court's treatment of the right of association and the right to lobby 
might not be incidental, especially since both case law was formed in the same era. 
It seems that the Court found it more important to develop the boundaries and 
protections for associational privacy then it did for the right to lobby, the existence 
of which was never affirmatively recognized by the Supreme Court. 
V. 
Lobbying Today: A Conclusion 
Since the beginning of the 20th century lobbyists have continuously grown in their 
numbers181 and lobbying today is a widespread practice at all levels of government, 
both federal and state. Especially at the federal level, lobbying has reached a never 
before seen phase as the result of a process which started in the second half of the 
19th century and was a direct result of Congress' expanding powers182. The issues 
that are lobbied for are as diverse as the people themselves, the ways in which 
lobbying is done is similarly varied and the amounts spent on lobbying are simply 
vast183. By becoming more diverse, we mean that more people are represented 
through lobbyists than ever before. It is not an overstatement to say that basically 
everybody is lobbying these days, either by herself or through an agent acting on 
her behalf. Naturally this is not a bad thing, but it does raise the number of people 
wanting access to elected officials, who simply have limited time at their disposal. 
Nevertheless these days more young people participate in lobbying than ever 
before184 and the same goes for women and minorities' 5.These developments show 
that lobbying has gone through a positive change in the past century. Lobbying is 
180 Buckley v. Valeo 424 U.S. 1,25. 
181 In 2008 the number of lobbyists in Washington D.C. surpassed 17.000 and total lobbying 
spending reached 1.59 billion USD. Center for Responsive Politics, 
http://www.open secrets.org/lobby/index.php. 
182 See supra note 43. 
183 See supra note 181. 
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no longer reserved for the favored few; it has opened its doors and at the same time 
it has become a true profession186. Besides this, it would be a mistake and indeed 
an unforgivable generalization to say that lobbying is all about quid pro quo 
arrangements bordering on corruption or trading of votes for campaign 
contributions. Lobbying is important because it is the main form in which 
individuals and communities, interest groups of all sorts can express their views on 
public policy. Lobbying would not be viable today, much less an important factor 
in government, if it hadn't be for the support that a lobbying group enjoys for its 
objectives187. It is crucial to see the citizens, the constituents behind each lobby 
group. It's an undisputed fact that everyone in Washington D.C. wants reelection 
and therefore each lobby group is worth as much as the support it enjoys from 
constituents. This is what makes lobbying a truly significant factor in governance. 
It is also important to see the variety of tasks and functions of lobbyists in their full 
scope. Lobbying involves a wide range of activities, of which meeting with elected 
officials or their members of staff is only one and not even the most significant 
aspect. Lobbyists' duties' involve - among others - research, making 
presentations, drafting model legislation and speeches, generating grassroots 
lobbying activity188. Naturally the main objective of lobbying remains the same: 
trying to influence public policy by encouraging the passage or defeat of 
legislation189. The multitude of tasks that lobbyists have to perform shows that 
lobbyists - besides voicing opinions of the citizens to the government - also 
contribute to the legislative process and this contribution is not the least 
insignificant190191. As the Supreme Court declared in United States v. Harriss: 
"Present-day legislative complexities are such that individual members of Congress 
cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures to which they are regularly 
subjected. Yet full realization of the American ideal of government by elected 
representatives depends on no small extent on their ability to properly evaluate 
such pressures"192. Lobbyists are generally experts in their field, and can add 
invaluably useful insight to the decision-making process by providing valid and 
reliable information to members of Congress. Indeed, these days a lobbyist who 
fails to do so, does not look forward to a long-lasting career in Washington D.C. 
and rightly so, as the main purpose of lobbing has been - and should be - acting as 
a surrogate for the constituents . 
1 8 6 THOMAS M. SUSMAN: supra note 13., p. 742. 
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This process has become at times distorted, especially when one looks at large 
corporate interests governing the scene of lobbying194, which makes one wonder 
what has happened to small interest groups and individuals. Large and powerful 
interest groups have an inherent danger: they may make members of Congress 
forget who their real constituents are and what interests they dispose of. Despite the 
fact that the lobbying scene has been tempered with scandals, partly as a result of 
the above-mentioned process, lobbying in general is still much more ethical than 
was in the 19th century195, for example, and this in my opinion is largely due to the 
"sunshine" that has been shed on lobbying. This sunshine, however, is not simply 
the result of lobbying restrictions that have been put into effect since the beginning 
of the 20th century. Although their role is undeniable in shedding "some" light on 
the way lobbying actually works, they are far from being truly effective or much 
less perfect. On the other hand political journalists and political watch groups have 
done a lot to shed real light on the way in which politics work. 
This is not enough, of course. Lobbying restrictions have been put into effect 
but without as much use as was expected of them, which is partly due to Congress' 
hesitance to enact truly meaningful lobbying legislation. Maybe one of the reasons 
for this is that any lobbying legislation that aims to be indeed effective should not 
leave the elected officials themselves out of the scope; otherwise lobbying 
legislation simply remains "much ado about nothing"196. It is also important to 
remember that lobbyists more often than not represent other people, so they are 
acting as an agent for someone else. This is especially significant when campaign 
contributions by lobbyists are limited, even though usually it is the client who 
donates, not the lobbyist himself197. Therefore more focus on the client and the 
issue that he or she represents should be in place, especially in the disclosure files. 
This would be helpful for voters and all interests groups in general. It would help 
the former become a more competent voter198, by knowing what interests try to 
reach his or her elected official and it would help the latter as well by identifying 
their competitors199 and it would enable the interest groups to act as "factions" and 
battle each other in a "true Madisonian fashion"200. Besides the above, any 
meaningful lobby legislation should extend its reach to grassroots lobby201; it 
194 It is worth mentioning that the biggest lobbyist spender in the U.S. is the American Chamber 
of Commerce. See supra note 182. 
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should try and deal with revolving-door lobbying effectively without losing the 
experience of former members of Congress202 and enforcement provisions should 
definitely be stricter203. In some cases (meals, entertainment, gifts and other 
services) prohibition seems to be necessary and inevitable to avoid even the 
appearance of corruption, which is just as bad as actual corruption204. 
Overall, true lobby reform is inevitable to restore or if not lost yet, preserve 
public trust in the political institutions. Any reform, however, must take into 
consideration First Amendment concerns and must not restrict an individual's 
possibility to access public officials to influence the decision-making process. 
Nevertheless it's important to mention that lobbying laws so far have not limited 
lobbying in its essence at all; they might have erected certain boundaries to avoid 
improprieties but overall lobbying legislation has not limited the right to lobbying 
in a substantial way. 
RADICS OLIVIA 
LOBBIZÁS ÉS AZ ELSŐ ALKOTMÁNYKIEGÉSZÍTÉS ÁLTAL 
MEGHATÁROZOTT PETÍCIÓS JOG 
(Összefoglalás) 
A lobbizás mind az Egyesült Államokban, mind az Európai Unióban 
tagadhatatlanul szignifikáns helyet foglal el a politikai döntéshozatalban. A 
tanulmány középpontjában a lobbizás egyesült államokbeli szerepe és története áll. 
Noha a lobbizás - objektíve nézve - sohasem tartozott a tiszteletet érdemlő 
szakmák közé, az Egyesült Államokban igazi szakmává nemesedett a 19. század 
második felétől kezdődően, szoros összefüggésben a szövetségi kormány 
hatalmának növekedésével. 
A 20. század elejétől kezdődően a lobbizást számos szövetségi törvény próbálta 
szabályozni, főleg az azt övező bizalmatlanság és az időről időre felbukkanó 
botrányok nyomán, ugyanakkor ezek a törekvések (tiltás vagy 
információszolgáltatás) a legtöbb esetben eredménytelenek voltak vagy legalábbis 
kevéssé sikeresek. A lobbizás törvényi szabályozása ugyanakkor korlátozhatja a 
személyek petíciós jogát, valamint a gyülekezési szabadságot, amely jogokat az 
Egyesült Államok Alkotmányának első alkotmány-kiegészítése biztosít minden 
202 See supra note 89. 
203 Disclosure should be done in an electronic format; preferably reports by lobbyists should be 
filed online. An independent federal agency with the necessary means available should be appointed 
to handle and cross-reference these reports and enforce the penalties if necessary. 
2 0 4 RICHARD BRIFFAULT: supra note 197., p. 108 . 
1 4 8 OLIVIA RADICS 
állampolgár számára. Éppen ezért a tanulmány célja az Egyesült Államok 
Legfelsőbb Bíróságának a petíciós jog és a gyülekezési szabadság megsértésével 
kapcsolatos döntéseinek bemutatása, azzal együtt, hogy a lobbizás átfogó reformja, 
természetesen a vonatkozó jogok tiszteletben tartása mellett, elengedhetetlenül 
szükséges napjainkban. 
